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This study uses administrative data linking students and teachers 
at the classroom level to estimate teacher value-added to student 
test  scores.    We  find  that  variation  in  teacher  quality  is  an 
important  contributor  to  student  achievement  –  more  important 
than  has  been  implied  by  previous  work.    This  result  is 
attributable, at least in part, to the lack of a ceiling effect in the 
testing instrument used to measure teacher quality.  We also show 
that teacher qualifications are almost entirely unable to predict 
value-added.  Motivated by this result, we consider whether it is 
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I.  Introduction 
It has been well established that education plays an important role in determining both economic 
growth and individual life outcomes (for example, see Katz and Murphy, 1992).  This has led to 
an  ongoing  interest  in  the  determinants  of  student  achievement,  including  teacher  quality. 
However, researchers have historically struggled to capture the role of teacher quality in the 
educational  production function. Given the importance of  education  and the undeniable role 
played by teachers, how much does variation in teacher quality affect student performance?   
 
The vast majority of the empirical work on teacher quality has relied on observable teacher 
qualifications to measure teacher quality.  As a whole, this body of research suggests that these 
qualifications are only weakly related to student performance.
1  Therefore, we shift our focus 
away from teacher qualifications and instead measure teacher quality  by value-added to student 
test scores.
2  Although value-added has been criticized by some, it continues to gain traction 
among both researchers and policy makers.  In fact, propo sals to base teacher evaluations on 
value-added, sometimes involving pay incentives, are becoming increasingly common.
3   
 
We analyze teacher value-added to student performance on math and reading standardized exams 
using micro-level data from San Diego elementary schools linking students and teachers at the 
classroom level.  Our results indicate that variation in teacher quality, measured by value-added, 
is considerably larger than previous research has implied.  Our larger variance estimates are 
                                                 
1 For reviews of this literature, see Hanushek (1986, 1996).   
2 There is a small literature that has shifted its focus to teacher value-added.  Recent studies include Rivkin, 
Hanushek and Kain (2005), Hanushek et al. (2005), Aaronson, Barrow and Sander (2007), Nye, Konstantopoulos 
and Hedges (2004), McCaffrey et al. (2003), Harris and Sass (2006) and Koedel (2007). 
3 For example, see Gordon, Kane and Staiger (2006).  Other examples include non-profit groups like Battelle for 
Kids in Columbus, OH, which has set up a three-year pilot program that uses value-added as an evaluation tool for 
teachers in Ohio and the state of Florida.   2 
attributable, at least in part, to the lack of a ceiling effect in the testing instrument that we use to 
measure teacher quality.  Test-score ceilings inhibit students‟ performance gains as test-score 
levels rise.  These ceilings are quite common in practice and have two important implications for 
value-added analysis.  First, in the presence of a test-score ceiling, estimating teacher effects 
from a typical value-added specification can lead to an understatement of the variance of teacher 
quality and, in turn, of the importance of teacher quality as an educational resource.  Second, a 
test-score ceiling will influence individual teachers‟ value-added estimates.  This latter issue is of 
particular concern if value-added is to be used to evaluate teacher performance.  
 
We  relate  our  value-added  measures  of  teacher  quality  to  the  qualifications  that  primarily 
determine  teacher  recruitment,  retention  and  salaries.    Our  results  support  previous  research 
indicating that these qualifications are poor predictors of teacher performance.  Even upper-
bound  estimates  of  the  ability  of  observable  teacher  qualifications  to  predict  variation  in 
outcome-based  teacher  quality  are  very  small.    Similarly,  teachers‟  salaries  are  virtually 
uncorrelated with their value-added to student test scores. 
 
Motivated by the weak link between teacher performance and teacher qualifications, and the 
growing interest in value-added more generally, we consider the role that value-added estimates 
might play in determining teacher accountability.  When compared to the current standards by 
which most teachers are judged (observable qualifications), a value-added approach offers a 
significant improvement in terms of rating teachers based on their contributions to actual student 
performance.  However, in both math and reading, estimation error constitutes a considerable   3 
portion of the individually estimated teacher effects.  Therefore, value-added modeling may be 
better suited as just one component of a more comprehensive system of teacher evaluation. 
 
II.  Empirical Strategy 
 
We  estimate  teacher  fixed  effects  from  a  value-added  model  of  student  achievement  in  the 
reduced form:
4 
(1)    ( 1) ijkst i ijks t it it it it TestScore TestScore ZipCode X Z C               
( ) ( ) ( ) J teacher K grade S school
it it it it D D D          
 
Equation (1) describes the test-score performance of student i taught by teacher j in grade k at 
school s in year t.  The model controls for heterogeneity in student ability by including student 
fixed effects (denoted by  i  ).
5  The vectors Xit, Zit and Cit contain time-varying student-, school- 
and classroom-level characteristics, respectively.  The variables included in these vectors are 
listed in Table 1.  Vectors of indicator variables for teachers, grade levels and schools are also 
included in the student-achievement specification.   
 
In  addition  to  student  fixed  effects,  our  model  includes  school  and  zip-code  fixed  effects.  
Together, these sets of fixed effects ensure that the model evaluates variation in teacher quality 
within  schools,  ignoring  any  between-school  variance.    Our  methodology  is  supported  by 
previous empirical work indicating that most of the variation in teacher quality occurs within 
                                                 
4 Value-added is often modeled in terms of test-score gains.  The gainscore specification is a specific case of the 
general value-added specification in equation (1).  We do consider gainscore models in our analysis.  As would be 
expected, teacher-effect estimates from a gainscore model that is analogous to equation (1) are highly correlated 
with our estimates. 
5 Students and teachers in San Diego are non-randomly assigned to classrooms within schools, highlighting the 
importance of controlling for student ability in the model of student achievement.  In an omitted exercise that is 
available from the authors upon request, we reject the hypothesis that, within schools and grades, current teachers do 
not predict previous test-score performance.  This result additionally implies that students may be sorted along 
dimensions that are unobserved.   4 
schools  as  opposed  to  between  schools  (Hanushek  et  al.,  2005;  Nye,  Konstantopoulos  and 
Hedges, 2004).  This is likely to be the case because the degree of sorting of teacher quality 
across schools, which would drive any between-school variation in teacher quality, is largely 
dependent on the success of schools in identifying and hiring the best teachers.
6  The empirical 
evidence suggests that schools may find it ve ry difficult to identify the best teachers and that 
even if they do, they may choose not to hire them.
7  In our model-sensitivity analysis in Section 
V, we show that essentially all of the variation in teacher quality in San Diego elementary 
schools exists within schools.   
 
The potential influence of peer effects is possibly the most worrisome confounding factor in any 
analysis  of teacher quality.    To  address  this  issue, our model  controls  for  the  year  (t -1) 
achievement of classroom-level peers.  We also n ote that the effect of any systematic ability 
grouping experienced by students will be largely absorbed at the student level because the 
student fixed effect will pick up the average peer effect experienced by a given student over the 
course of the panel.  Similarly, we control for class size to prevent variation in class size from 
being misinterpreted as variation in teacher quality.  
 
As it is written, the model in (1) will produce biased estimates of the coefficients of interest 
because the demeaned  erro r term will be correlated with the demeaned lagged dependent 
variable.  Therefore, we adopt the method of Anderson and Hsiao (1981) to estimate the 
                                                 
6 Teachers‟ preferences for better schools could also affect teacher sorting.  However, hiring restrictions imposed by 
the labor contract between San Diego Unified School District and the teacher‟s union should substantially limit the 
effects of teachers‟ preferences on teacher sorting.  This will be discussed in more detail in Section V. 
7 Section VIII of this paper shows that observable teacher qualifications are virtually uncorrelated with outcome-
based teacher quality.  In addition, numerous studies have documented the weak link between observable teacher 
qualifications and student performance.  See, for example, Aaronson et al. (2007), Angrist and Guryan (2003), Betts 
(1995), Betts, Zau and Rice (2003), Hanushek (1986, 1996), Kane, Rockoff and Staiger (2006).  Also, Ballou (1996) 
argues that schools may choose not to hire the most qualified teachers even when given the opportunity.   5 
equation.  The method involves first-differencing to remove the student fixed effects, and then, 
to account for correlation between the first-differenced lagged dependent variable and the first-
differenced  error  term,  estimating  this  model  using  2SLS,  instrumenting  for 
( ) ( ) ( ) TestScore TestScore ijks t ijks t    1 2  with  ( ) ( ) TestScoreijks t2 .  The key assumption required for 
this instrumentation to be valid is that the error terms in equation (1) are serially uncorrelated.  
Although  this  assumption  is  not  directly  verifiable  using  equation  (1),  we  use  the  first -
differenced error terms to test for serial correlation between the  εit‟s and find that this primary 
assumption is upheld.
8  The first-differenced version of equation (1) is detailed below: 
 
(2)    
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The second term in parentheses on the right-hand side is the fitted value for the test score change 
from the first stage of the 2SLS procedure.
9  We evaluate the effects of teacher quality on student 
performance in both math and reading using equation (2). 
 
III.  Data  
This  study  is  based  on  panel  data  from  the  San  Diego  Unified  School  District  (SDUSD), 
following elementary school students and teachers over time.  We use student test-score data 
                                                 
8 The white noise assumption for the error term is verified by evaluating the level of serial correlation between the 
first-differenced error terms, within students, in the first-differenced version of equation (1) below.  The individual 
εit‟s are serially uncorrelated if the first-differenced error terms are serially correlated with a magnitude of 
approximately -0.5.   For students in which more than one first-differenced equation is estimated, we estimate that 
the serial correlation between the first-differenced error terms to be -0.47. 
9 Robust standard errors for all 2-stage-least-squares coefficients in this model were generated with one important 
adjustment.  The differenced error term in equation (2) is serially correlated among students with more than one 
equation in our model.  We structurally enforced this property of the error term into the variance-covariance matrix 
for relevant students.     6 
from the Stanford 9 standardized test for both math and reading from the 1998-99 school year 
through the 2001-02 school year.  Our analysis is based on test-score data from over 16,000 
students  and  we  evaluate  the  effects  of  over  1,000  elementary  school  teachers  at  SDUSD.  
Students and teachers are linked at the classroom level and an extensive list of school, student 
and teacher characteristics is available.  
 
The Stanford 9 standardized test is psychometrically scaled such that a one-point gain in student 
performance at any point in the schooling process is meant to correspond to the same amount of 
learning.  A related characteristic of the Stanford 9 test is that, unlike some other standardized 
tests, it does not exhibit a pronounced test-score ceiling in math or reading performance (through 
the 5
th grade).
10  This feature of the test makes it a particularly useful tool for m easuring the 
effects  of  teacher  quality  on  student  outcomes  throughout  the  entire  range  of  student 
achievement as will be discussed in further detail in Section VI. 
 
SDUSD is the second largest school district in California and is quite diverse.  The stude nt 
population is approximately 27 percent white, 37 percent Hispanic, 18 percent Asian/Pacific 
Islander and 16 percent Black.  28 percent of SDUSD students are English learners, and some 60 
percent are eligible for meal assistance.  Both of these shares are larger than those of the state of 
California as a whole.  As far as standardized testing performance, students in SDUSD trailed 
                                                 
10 To check for the presence of a test-score ceiling in our data, we group all students into deciles based on their raw 
test score level in year (t-2). We then check whether the average test-score gains of students in year (t) are lower for 
students in higher deciles.  In math, there is no relation.  However, in reading there is a mild but persistent decline in 
test score gains as students make progress in the test-score levels distribution.  See Appendix F for more details.   7 
very slightly behind national reading averages in 1999-2000.  On the contrary, SDUSD students 
narrowly exceeded national norms in math.
11  
 
This study focuses on elementary school students because they have the same teacher for the 
entire day.  This removes potentially confounding effects such as teacher spillovers that may be 
present at the high school level.  Because students are tested in 2
nd through 5
th grade (6
th grade is 
part of middle school at SDUSD), we have up to four years of test scores for each student in the 
panel.  Table 1 details the controls available for students, teachers, classrooms and schools in this 
study.  Appendix A provides additional details about the data used for this project. 
 
Table 1. Description of Key Data Elements 
Time-Varying Student 
Characteristics 
Controls for grade levels, parental education, level of test score in 
year (t-1), EL or non-EL (EL = English Learner), FEP or non-FEP 
(FEP = Fully English Proficient), student was accelerated a grade, 
held back a grade, a school changer, terms attended, school days 





Controls for the racial makeup and heterogeneity of schools, school 
size, whether school is year-round, percent of school on free lunch, 
percent  of  school  EL,  percent  of  school  FEP,  number  of  peer 
coaches, number of peer coach apprentices, percent of school that 





Class size, peer achievement in year (t-1) 
Teacher Characteristics  Dummy variables to control for subject of undergraduate degree, 
undergraduate minor, whether undergraduate institution is a top 100 
university  based  on  research  dollars,  highest  level  of  education, 
subject of highest degree, level of credentialing, experience, salary, 
time  at  SDUSD,  controls  for  any  supplementary  authorizations, 
emergency  authorizations,  and  CLAD  (Cross-cultural  Language 
and Academic Development) or Bilingual CLAD certification  
 
 
                                                 
11 District characteristics summarized from Betts et al. (2003).   8 
 
IV.  Results – The Variance of Teacher Quality 
 
In this section we evaluate the importance of variation in teacher quality as a determinant of 
student performance in math and reading.  Table 2 reports Wald statistics generated under the 
null hypothesis that all teacher effects are equal.  Variation in teacher quality is shown, quite 
convincingly, to be a statistically significant determinant of student achievement for both math 
and reading in elementary school. 
 
Table 2.  Wald Tests for the Statistical Significance of Variation in Teacher Quality 
   
H0:   12 ... J          
Math Achievement 
 
Wald Statistic:  2,636 
P-Value:      < 0.01 
Reading Achievement 
 
Wald Statistic:  2,117 




Although  the  results  in  Table  2  indicate  that  variation  in  teacher  quality  is  a  statistically 
significant determinant of student achievement, they do not provide information about economic 
significance.    To  analyze  the  economic  importance  of  variation  in  teacher  quality  as  a 
determinant  of  student  outcomes,  we  empirically  estimate  the  magnitude  of  the  variance  of 
teacher quality.
12  This will allow us to evaluate the effect s of distributional shifts in teacher 
quality on student performance.  We start by calculating the sample variance of the estimated 
teacher coefficients: 
(3)            Var( )   =
2
11










         
   
                                                 
12 We follow the method of Koedel (2007) to estimate the magnitude of the variance of teacher quality.   9 
Each fixed-effect coefficient is comprised of two components - the true signal of teacher quality 
and  estimation  error,  ˆ
j j j    .    Equation  (3)  overstates  the  variance  of  teacher  quality 
because it includes the variance of the estimation error.  We define the estimation-error variance 
as Var( )   and the variance of the teacher-quality signal, the outcome of interest, as  () Var  .  To 
separate the estimation-error variance from the variance of the teacher-quality signal, we first 
assume that  Cov( , )    0.
13  This allows for the total variance of teacher fixed effects to be 
decomposed as follows: 
 
(4)      ˆ ( ) ( ) +  ( ) Var Var Var                
 
Next, we scale the Wald statistic and use it as an estimate of the ratio between the total fixed-
effects variance and the error variance:
14 
 
(5)   
1 1 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ *[( )'( ) ( )] ( )/ ( )
1
() J J J V Var Var
J
     




In the above formulation,  ˆ   is the Jx1 vector of estimated teacher fixed effects,   is the sample 
average of the  ˆ ' j s  ,  ˆ
J V  is the JxJ portion of the estimated variance matrix corresponding to the 
teacher effects being tested and  J   is a Jx1 vector of ones.
15  Equation (5) weights the total 
                                                 
13 This assumption is not directly verifiable because both   and   are unobserved.  If for some reason the signal 
and error components of teacher fixed effects were negatively correlated then the results presented here would 
understate the variance of teacher quality.  If the converse were the case, the estimates would be overstated. 
14 In the variance matrix that we use for our Wald statistics we set all covariance terms to zero.  This covariance 
restriction has a negligible effect on our results and allows for a straightforward calculation of the magnitude of the 
variance of teacher quality.  See Appendix B for details. 
15 The variance matrix used in the Wald tests is the diagonal of the full variance-covariance matrix for the relevant 
set of teacher coefficients.  Substituting the full variance-covariance matrix for the variance matrix has virtually no 
effect on the results.   10 
fixed-effects variance by the estimation error variance on a coefficient-by-coefficient basis.  See 
Appendix B for details.  
 
The magnitude of the variance of the teacher-quality signal can be estimated from equations (4) 
and (5).  For example, if the scaled Wald statistic is estimated to be A then the variance of the 
teacher-quality signal can be estimated by: 
 
(6)    ˆˆ ( ) ( ) - ( ( )/ ) Var Var Var A        
   
To facilitate the interpretation of our results, we convert our estimates of the variance of the 
teacher-quality signal obtained from equation (6) into units of within-grade standard deviations.
16  
For math, we estimate that the effect of a one -standard deviation change in teacher quality on 
student performance is equivalent to 0.26 average within -grade standard deviations of the test.  
For reading, we estimate an analogous effect of 0.19 average within -grade standard deviations.  
These results are detailed in the first column of Table 3.
17 
 
The second column in Table 3 shows the predicted effects of a one-standard-deviation change in 
teacher quality expressed as a proportion of average annual test-score gains.
18  In math, the effect 
                                                 
16 To do this we divide the predicted effect on test scores from having a one-standard-deviation increase in teacher 
quality by the weighted average (across grades) of the standard deviation of end-of-year scores within each grade.  
The weights are our sample size in each grade.  The resulting ratio provides one estimate of the average impact on 
student performance of a one-standard deviation move upwards in the teacher quality distribution.   
17 The estimates in Table 3 are presented in average within-grade standard deviations of the test that are calculated 
using all students at SDUSD who have a test-score record.  An alternative would be to use only students in our final 
sample to calculate the average within-grade standard deviations of the test.  Estimated within-grade standard 
deviations based only on students in our sample will be smaller because students used in our sample are more 
homogeneous than the entire sample at SDUSD (due to the requirements of the fixed effects specification, see 
Appendix A for details).  We ultimately present our estimates using the within-grade standard deviation estimates 
from the all-student sample because these estimates are likely to be more comparable to others in the literature.   
18 We weight the gains across grades by the sample size in each grade to obtain a weighted average.   11 
of a one-standard deviation change in teacher quality is equivalent to 0.41 student-years.  In 
reading, we estimate an effect of 0.31 student-years. 
 
Table 3.  Estimated Effects of Having a One-Standard-Deviation Above-Average Teacher 
on Student Performance 
  Proportion of Average Within-
Grade Standard Deviations 




















The estimates of the variance of teacher quality presented in Table 3 provide strong evidence of 
the value of teacher quality as a resource in the educational production function and are 
considerably larger than previous empirical estimates.  For example, our estimate of the effect of 
a one-standard deviation improvement in teacher quality on student math performance is 
approximately 67 percent larger than an analogous estimate from  Hanushek et al. (2005).
19  In 
both math and reading, we find that significant gains in student pe rformance can be obtained 
through improvements in teacher quality. 
 
 
V.  Specification Checks and Sensitivity Analysis 
 
The value-added specification of the student-achievement model that we employ, which includes 
student fixed effects to control for differences in students‟ test-score trajectories, is unique in the 
literature.  In this section, we evaluate the model in more detail and consider the sensitivity of 
our variance estimates to alternative specifications.   
                                                 
19 The 67 percent figure reported in the text is arrived at by taking the raw-gains-scaled estimates from Hanushek et 
al. (2005) as reported by the authors and comparing them to our estimates.  There is an even greater difference 
between our estimates and those found in Rockoff (2004) and in Rivkin et al. (2005).  At the opposite extreme, when 
compared to estimates from Nye et al. (2004), who use a residual-variance approach that does not correct for 
sampling variation, our estimates are somewhat smaller.     12 
 
Table  4  documents  four  different  value-added  specifications  for  the  model  of  student 
achievement from which teacher fixed effects can be estimated.  The first column shows the full 
model estimated in equation (2).  Columns 2 through 4 show three different restricted models.  
More detail is added to each specification moving from column 2 to column 4.  Wald tests for 
the  completeness  of  the  restricted  models  against  the  full  model  indicate  that  the  restricted 
models in columns 2 and 3 are underspecified.
20 
 
For each restricted model in Table 4, the b ottom two rows of the table compare the vectors of 
teacher fixed effects estimated from our full model to the given restricted model by reporting the 
correlation  between  the  vectors.    This  exercise  is  performed  for  the  math  and  reading 
specifications.   
                                                 
20 P-values from Wald tests of the null hypotheses that the coefficients on the omitted variables in the restricted 
models are zero are less than 0.01 for all omitted variable groups except student fixed effects.  We do not run tests 
for the statistical significance of the student fixed effects because of the computational demands of such tests.  
Furthermore, the large-N, small-T structure of the panel dataset implies that the results from these tests would be 
rather uninformative (lacking power).  However, student fixed effects have a strong theoretical justification for 
inclusion in the model.  For further discussion, see Harris and Sass (2006).  Finally, note that all of our major 
findings are generally robust to models of student achievement that are not first-differenced (see Table 5). The 
decision about whether to first-difference the value-added specification seems to be most important in determining 
teachers‟ value-added rankings (as indicated by Table 4) and merits additional attention in future research.   13 
 
Table  4.    Estimated  Correlation  Coefficients  Relating  Teacher  Fixed  Effects  Estimates 
from Restricted Models to Estimates from the Full Specification   
  (1)    (2)  (3)  (4) 
Included Explanatory Variables           
Lagged Test Score  Yes    Yes  Yes  Yes 
Grade-Level Fixed Effects  Yes    Yes  Yes  Yes 
Student-Level Covariates  Yes    No  Yes  Yes 
School- and Classroom-Level Covariates, 
School and Zip Code Fixed Effects  
Yes    No  No  Yes 
Student Fixed Effects (First Differenced)  Yes    No  No  No 
           
Correlation Coefficient - Math  1    0.64  0.67  0.74 
           
Correlation Coefficient - Reading  1    0.50  0.53  0.62 
Notes:  Correlation coefficients compare teacher effects weighted by their standard errors.  Column 1 shows our full 
specification to which the restricted specifications in columns 2 through 5 are compared.  Wald tests reject all of the 




Why do estimates of teacher quality change so much when we fail to control for unobserved 
student heterogeneity?  One explanation is that teachers are assigned to groups of students in 
non-random ways based on unobservable student characteristics.
21  Any model that does not 
control  for  this  will  mistake nly  attribute  inter -student  variation  in  achievement  gains  to 
individual teachers.  The strong explanatory power associated with student -specific factors 
implies that models that do not control for these factors may produce biased estimates. 
 
Another explanation is that moving from the between-school specification to the within-student 
and within-school specification alters the comparison groups for teachers.  If there are significant 
differences in teacher quality across schools at SDUSD, we may wish to co mpare teachers 
between as well as within schools.  To evaluate this issue we consider the sensitivity of our 
variance estimates to alternative specifications, including models that exclude both school and 
                                                 
21 Students do appear to be assigned to classrooms in non-random ways at SDUSD (for example, see Table 5 or 
footnote 5).   14 
student fixed effects.  Table 5 shows eight different models from which we estimate the variance 
of teacher quality using the variance decomposition in equation (6).
22  The table indicates that the 
vast majority of the variation in teacher quality among elementary school teachers at SDUSD 
occurs within schools. 
                                                 
22 Beyond evaluating the sensitivity of our variance estimates to alternative specifications, we also consider the 
possibility that our variance estimates are inflated because class-size reductions in California have increased the 
number of inexperienced teachers at SDUSD relative to other non-California locales.  To do this, we separately 
estimate the variance of teacher quality among experience groups with more/less than two years, more/less than 
three years, and more/less than 5 years of experience.  In line with our findings in Section VIII of this paper, we find 
that differences in teacher experience explain just a small portion of the variance of teacher quality.  For example, 
the variance of quality among teachers with a sample-average of three years of experience or less is just 5 percent 
larger than the variance of teacher quality across the entire sample.  Ultimately, our interest is in the total variation 
in teacher quality experienced by students and because of this we do not control for teacher experience directly in 
our models.   15 
Table 5.  Teacher Fixed Effects Variance Estimates, Adjusted Using Equation (4), from Various Math and Reading Student-
Achievement Specifications 
  Test-Score Levels    Value-Added 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)    (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Explanatory Variables                   
Lagged Test Score  No  No  No  No    Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Student-Level Covariates  No  Yes  Yes  Yes    No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
School- and Classroom-Level Covariates, 
School and Zip-Code Fixed Effects 
No  No  Yes  Yes    No  No  Yes  Yes 
Student Fixed Effects  No  No  No  Yes    No  No  No  Yes 
                   
Estimated Variance of Teacher Quality – 


















                   
Estimated Variance of Teacher Quality – 


















Note:  For the specifications that omit student fixed effects, additional time-invariant student-level characteristics are included into the models (specifically, 
information on race and gender) and errors are clustered at the student level.  All models include indicator variables for students‟ grade levels. 
   16 
The first vertical panel of Table 5 (columns 1 – 4) evaluates teacher effects estimated from a test-
score-levels specification.  Changes in the variance estimates moving from left to right in this 
panel  show  the  importance  of  the  various  components  of  the  student-achievement  model  in 
removing sorting bias based on test-score levels.  The second vertical panel evaluates teacher 
effects estimated from our value-added specification.   
 
We start by estimating the variance of average test-score levels, conditional on students‟ current 
grade levels, across teachers at SDUSD.  These estimates are presented in column 1 of the table 
and incorporate not only teacher quality, but also any sorting of students and teachers throughout 
SDUSD across schools and classrooms.  In moving from column 1 to column 2, we add our set 
of student-level variables to the test-score-levels specification.  The variance estimates fall by 
approximately 50 percent for both the math and reading models.  This indicates that observable 
student-level  variables  control  for  a  sizeable  portion  of  the  district-wide  sorting  that  is 
contributing to the variance estimates in column 1.  In moving from column 2 to column 3, the 
inclusion of the set of school- and classroom-level covariates and school and zip-code fixed 
effects further reduces the estimated variance of teacher quality.  One possible explanation for 
this effect is that test-score-levels sorting bias is reduced.  That is, student sorting across schools 
that  is  aligned  with  test-score  performance,  in  levels,  is  removed  by  the  inclusion  of  these 
controls.  Another possibility is that variation in teacher quality due to teacher sorting across 
schools is removed from the total variance estimates.  Finally, we add student fixed effects to the 
levels specification in column 4 to control for any within-school sorting of students and teachers 
that is not captured by observables.  The estimates in column 4 show that there is a significant 
degree of positive student-teacher matching within schools based on students‟ test-score levels.    17 
The  inclusion  of  student  fixed  effects  significantly  reduces  the  estimated  variance  of  the 
conditional teacher means at SDUSD by removing upward bias generated by this matching. 
 
We also estimate the variance of the estimated teacher effects across models within the value-
added framework.  These results are presented in columns 5 – 8.  The pattern of adjustments in 
the variance of the conditional teacher means when moving across models in the value-added 
framework is quite similar to the pattern displayed in the levels specifications with two important 
exceptions.  First, in both math and reading, school-level variables do not affect the magnitude of 
the  estimated  variance  of  teacher  quality  in  the  value-added  framework.    This  implies  that 
although  teachers  may  sort  themselves  based  on  observable  student  characteristics,  there  is 
virtually no sorting of teacher quality across schools at SDUSD conditional on these observable 
student characteristics. This lends strong support to our empirical approach that estimates teacher 
value-added  within  schools  and  students.    Second,  in  the  value-added  reading  model,  the 
inclusion of student fixed effects into the otherwise fully specified model leads to a very mild 
increase in the estimated variance of teacher quality.  Given positive student-teacher matching, 
we would expect the opposite effect.  
 
Estimates from columns 6 and 7 in Table 5 indicate that there is virtually no between-school 
variation in teacher quality, measured by value-added, across San Diego elementary schools.  
The lack of between-school variation in teacher value-added is likely to be largely the result of 
the inability of schools to identify and hire the best teachers.  In Section VIII, we show that the 
observable teacher qualifications most commonly linked to teacher recruitment, retention and   18 
salaries are almost entirely unable to predict teacher value-added.
23  Furthermore, Ballou (1996) 
shows that even when schools are able to hire seemingly superior teachers, they often choose not 
to.  Finally, schools at SDUSD are further li mited in their ability to select the most effective 
teachers by the labor contract between SDUSD and the teachers‟ union.  This contract requires 
that schools with an open position choose from the five teachers with the most district seniority 
who apply for the position and meet the stated qualifications, restricting each school‟s pool of 
potential applicants.
24  Overall, the results from Table 5 suggest that the conventional wisdom 
that there is significant variation in teacher value-added between schools at the elementary level 
may be quite inaccurate.
25 
 
Column 8 of Table 5 shows that the inclusion of student fixed effects in the value -added model 
of student achievement does not significantly inflate the magnitude of the estimated variance of 
teacher  quality  in  either  subject.    In  fact,  for  math,  moving  to  the  student -fixed-effects 
specification results in a decrease in the estimated variance of teacher quality .  This is intuitive 
because this specification reduces the bias generated by positive student-teacher matching within 
schools.  Nonetheless, previous researchers who have estimated outcome -based teacher quality 
have tended to exclude student fixed effects from the value -added specification, presumably 
because of a belief that the student-fixed-effects model artificially inflates the estimated variance 
of teacher quality by adding noise to the model of student achievement.  A comparison of our 
math and reading results in Table 5 provides insight into this concern.  We find that the student -
                                                 
23 For additional evidence, see Aaronson et al. (2007), Angrist and Guryan (2003), Betts (1995), Betts et al. (2003), 
Hanushek (1986, 1996) and Kane et al. (2006). 
24 Empirical evidence suggests that experience beyond the first few years of teaching is, at most, marginally related 
to teacher value-added. 
25 This conventional wisdom is likely borne from differences in observable teacher qualifications across schools that 
are easily documented.  However, the link between these observable teacher qualifications and actual teacher value-
added is so weak that differences across schools along this dimension provide no information about differences 
across schools in terms of actual teacher quality as measured by value-added.   19 
fixed-effects specification can lead to inflated variance estimates (for example, mildly in our 
reading specification), but that this apparently counterintuitive effect is easily explainable.  In 
both math and reading, controls for student ability remove omitted variables bias in teacher fixed 
effects  generated  by  positive  student-teacher  matching.    However,  in  our  reading  analysis, 
properties of the testing instrument used to measure teacher quality are such that the bias created 
by this matching is downward.  The next section explores this issue in detail. 
 
VI.  Estimating the Variance of Teacher Quality and the Testing Instrument 
The use of the Stanford 9 standardized exam at SDUSD is a fortuitous circumstance for our 
evaluation of teacher quality.  Unlike other testing instruments that have recently been used to 
estimate outcome-based teacher quality, the Stanford 9 exam is not a minimum competency test.  
Minimum competency tests are likely to exhibit strong ceiling effects characterized by students 
experiencing  systematic  declines  in  test-score  gains  as  they  advance  in  the  test-score  levels 
distribution.
26  Importantly, a test-score ceiling may affect more than just the highest achievers.   
Appendix F details the test -score ceiling properties of the Stanford 9 standardized e xam at 
SDUSD and shows that the math portion of the Stanford 9 does not exhibit a test-score ceiling at 
all.  For reading, the Stanford 9 exhibits a mild test-score ceiling.  
 
Test-score ceilings are a major consideration in the estimation of outcome-based teacher quality 
because they restrict the capacity of the testing instrument to capture the full extent of students‟ 
human capital development.  Hanushek et al. (2005) report that in their analysis of one large 
Texas school district, gains in test scores are strongly negatively related to previous performance.  
                                                 
26 Such a relationship will exist for any testing instrument due to regression to the mean.  However, in addition to 
any effects from regression to the mean, minimum competency tests should exert additional downward pressure on 
test-score gains as students make progress in the test-score levels distribution.   20 
They show that approximately two-thirds of the students in their sample (those at the top of the 
test-score levels distribution) are at a level of achievement such that the average annual test-score 
gain of students in their same achievement-level decile is negative.
27  Rockoff (2004) does not 
examine test-score ceiling effects in his analysis in great detail, but does indicate that 3 to 6 
percent of students in his study have test scores that are at  the maximum attainable score.
28  
Other studies fail to address this important issue altogether.   
 
To illustrate how a test -score ceiling can affect estimates of the variance of outcome -based 
teacher quality, consider a simple example.  Teacher effects are estimated using the value-added 
framework, but suppose that the modeling strategy does not control for unobserved student 
ability in gains.  Assume, as is the norm, that students and teachers are positively matched in 
terms of ability within schools and that the most able students tend to have larger test-score gains 
and therefore, higher test-score levels.  First, consider a testing instrument given to students that 
does not exhibit a test-score ceiling.  That is, the average gain for high-achieving students is not 
structurally restricted to be lower than the average gain for low-achieving students by the test.  In 
the absence of controls for student ability, positive student-teacher matching in this scenario will 
result in a bias away from zero for all tea cher fixed effect estimates.
29  This is because the best 
teachers will be matched with the brightest students (those with the highest gains) and the worst 
teachers with the students for whom gains are most difficult.  This will inflate the estimated 
variance of teacher quality.  
                                                 
27 The strength of the negative relationship reported by these authors implies that ceiling effects, in addition to any 
regression to the mean, are a relevant concern in their analysis. 
28 For comparison, just 0.09 and 0.077 percent of students in our math and reading samples respectively scored at 
the top score possible for their grade. 
29 Assuming that the distribution of teacher effects is centered around zero.  More generally, the bias will be away 
from the center of the teacher-effect distribution, increasing the variance.   21 
 
Second, consider the same scenario of positive student-teacher matching in terms of ability but 
instead  imagine  a  testing  instrument  that  exhibits  a  test-score  ceiling.    In  this  case,  lower-
performing students will be able to achieve higher test-score gains, on average, simply because 
of the structure of the test (an example of such a test would be a minimum competency test).  
Again, the best teachers will teach the most able students but instead of generating an upward 
bias in teacher effects, these teachers will instead be penalized by the test because their students‟ 
gains will be suppressed.  Similarly, the worst teachers will be rewarded by the test because their 
students‟ gains will be, relatively speaking, overstated.  In this scenario, the variance of teacher 
quality  will  be  understated  because  both  the  best  and  worst  teachers  will  have  coefficient 
estimates that will be biased toward zero as a result of positive student-teacher matching. 
 
Now consider the inclusion of controls for student ability in the model of student achievement in 
both of the above scenarios.  In the first scenario, where there is not a test-score ceiling, the 
inclusion of student fixed effects will remove the upward bias in the teacher fixed effects and 
reduce the estimated variance of teacher quality.  This effect can be seen in moving from column 
7 to column 8 in Table 5 for the math analysis, where we find no evidence of a test-score ceiling 
at SDUSD (see Appendix F).  In the second scenario, where a test-score ceiling is present, the 
inclusion of student fixed effects will again remove bias associated with positive student-teacher 
matching.  However, we will observe the opposite effect on the estimated variance of teacher 
quality because positive student-teacher matching creates bias toward zero in the teacher fixed 
effects.  The inclusion of student fixed effects removes this bias and the estimated variance of 
teacher quality actually increases.  This effect can be seen in moving from column 7 to column 8   22 
in Table 5 for the reading analysis, where we find evidence of a test-score ceiling at SDUSD (see 
Appendix F).
30  Although the effect of the inclusion of student fixed effects on the estimated 
variance of teacher quality works in opposite directions in th ese different scenarios, it removes 
bias from the same source in both cases  – positive student-teacher matching.  Finally, note that 
the ceiling effects in our reading analysis are quite mild.  In a minimum competency testing 
environment, a test-score ceiling could have an effect that is significantly more pronounced. 
 
VII.  Correlation of Teacher Effectiveness Across Subjects:  Math & Reading 
 
Using the teacher coefficients estimated from the models of student achievement for math and 
reading, we examine the correlation  of teacher quality across subjects.  Because  elementary 
school  students  typically  stay  with  the  same  teacher  for  the  entire  day,  this  question  is  of 
particular relevance for this study.   
 
We estimate the correlation coefficient between    m  and    r  (the vectors of teacher coefficients 
estimated from the math and reading specifications, respectively) to be 0.35.  However, this 
correlation defines the relationship between ( m+m) and ( r+r), not  m and  r (where m 
and r represent estimation error).  Furthermore, the relationship between m and r is unclear 
a priori.  Following Rockoff (2004), if we assume that the correlation of true teacher quality 
across subjects for all teachers is the same, we can get an idea of the direction of the bias 
introduced by the measurement error in the estimated teacher fixed effects.  Measurement error 
will be smaller for teachers with a greater number of student-year observations.  Therefore, we 
                                                 
30 Relative to other studies, the test-score ceiling present in the reading analysis here is very weak, which in turn 
explains why its effect on our variance estimates is small. However, the very fact that the estimated variance of 
teacher quality, measured in terms of reading performance, does not decline when student fixed effects are added to 
the value-added model is an indication of the ceiling effect.   23 
compare the correlation coefficient between    m  and    r  for a subset of teachers who have a 
relatively high number of students to that of the entire teacher sample to get an idea of the 
direction of the effect of the correlation between  m and  r on our initial correlation estimate.  
The estimated correlation coefficient from our selected subset of teachers is higher than its 
counterpart from the full teacher set.  Thus, measurement error is biasing our estimate of the 
correlation of teacher quality across subjects toward zero.
31  We present our estimate of the 
correlation between    m and    r , 0.35, as a lower-bound estimate of the correlation of teacher 
quality across subjects.   
 
To estimate an upper bound on the correlation of teacher quality across subjects, we estimate the 
correlation between  m  and  r under the assumption that the correlation between m  and r is 
zero (See Appendix C for details).   Our upper-bound estimate of the  correlation coefficient 
relating teacher quality across subjects is 0.64.  Overall, our bounded estimate (0.35 to 0.64) 
indicates that the ability to be an effective teacher, at least at the elementary level, does not 
appear to be strongly subject-specific.   
 
VIII.  Teacher Fixed Effects and Observable Teacher Qualifications 
 
Because variation in outcome-based teacher quality has been shown to be such an important 
contributor to student achievement, it is of interest to identify observable teacher qualifications 
that are strong predictors of teacher performance.  We use a second-stage regression to evaluate 
the ability of a rich set of observable teacher qualifications to predict teacher value-added as 
                                                 
31 Our finding in this regard is in accordance with Rockoff (2004).   24 
estimated by our empirical model.  Many of the observable qualifications used in this analysis 
are important determinants of teacher recruitment, retention and salaries.     
 
The SDUSD dataset includes over 50 unique observable teacher qualifications that may predict 
teacher value-added.  However, running the “kitchen sink” model yields limited information due 
to collinearity among these qualifications.  Therefore, we initially include only key observable 
qualifications that are unlikely to be highly collinear in our model.  We report results using both 
the smaller model and the model containing all of the observable teacher qualifications available 
in the dataset (for a listing of the controls used in the richer model, see Table 1).   
 
Consider the following second-stage regression that we would like to estimate:  
(7)       j j j X e         
 
Here,  j is the true measure of teacher quality for teacher j in either subject,  X j  is a vector of 
observable  teacher  qualifications,  α  is  an  intercept  and  e j   is  the  unobserved  error  term.  
However,  in  the  second  stage,  our  dependent  variable  is  a  statistical  estimate  and  thus  is 
measured with error.   
(8)    ˆ
j j j           
 
The estimation error,  j  , will appear in the second-stage error term.  We would like to estimate 
  and    from equation (7) above.  However, because of the estimation error in the dependent 
variable, we must estimate the following equation: 
(9)    j j j j ˆ =   + X  +   + e        
   25 
Here,  j   and e j  are assumed to be uncorrelated and  j   may be non-symmetric.  The appropriate 
estimation strategy for efficient estimates of   and    under these circumstances is WLS.  The 
appropriate  variance-covariance  matrix  to  use  for  weighting,  following  Borjas  and  Sueyoshi 
(1994), is: 
Ω =   e
2IJ +   V  
 
where J is the number of teacher coefficients and   V  is a diagonal matrix whose elements are 
from  the  diagonal  of  the  estimated  variance-covariance  matrix  corresponding  to  the  teacher 
coefficients from equation (2).    V  estimates the variance matrix of  j  .    e
2 can be estimated 




                                                 
32 Regressors for our second-stage analysis are averaged within teachers where relevant. 
33 Despite empirical evidence indicating that teacher experience is non-linearly related to effectiveness, we model it 
linearly here.  This is because the linear experience term maximizes the R
2 from the OLS analog to the GLS model 
presented in the text.  (It maximizes the GLS R
2 as well, although the GLS R
2 is difficult to interpret).  In an 
auxiliary analysis available from the authors upon request, we also estimate our second-stage model using 
experience indicator variables rather than the linear term.  Our results from that analysis are virtually identical to 
those presented in the text.   26 
Table  6.    Dependent  Variables:  Estimated  Teacher  Coefficients  from  Equation  (2)  in 






















































     
R
2  0.0341  0.0138 
Adj. R
2  0.0198  -0.0007 
* Significant at 5% level of confidence. 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
Observable teacher qualifications are averaged over time within teachers where relevant. 
Teacher experience has been capped at 10 years.  That is, teachers with over 10 years of experience are input as having 10 years 
of experience.  It is a well-established fact that the returns to teaching experience decline significantly as experience increases.  
Indeed,  if  teaching  experience  were  not  capped  at  10  years,  then  experience  would  cease  to  significantly  predict  effective 
teachers.  
The  variable „School  Top 100‟ indicates  whether  the undergraduate institution  attended  by  the teacher  was in  the top  100 
universities in terms of research dollars. 
Supplementary authorizations are obtained by completing a required set of college courses in the field of  the authorization.  
These authorizations are not required for any elementary school teachers. 
 
Rather than focusing on causality, we instead consider the overall power of observable teacher 
qualifications  to  predict  variation  in  outcome-based  teacher  quality.    Although  the  FGLS 
estimates presented in Table 6 are efficient given the estimation error in the teacher fixed effects, 
R
2  statistics  generated  from  GLS  models  have  an  unclear  interpretation  (for  example,  these 
statistics are not bounded on the interval [0,1]).  Therefore, to provide an in-depth answer to the   27 
question  of  how  much  variation  in  teacher  quality  can  be  explained  by  observable  teacher 
qualifications, we use the R
2 formula from the OLS analogs to the above GLS models. 
 
Following  the  methodology  outlined  in  Appendix  D,  we  generate  upper  bounds  on  the  R
2 
statistics for our math and reading second-stage models by manually removing the variation in 
the dependent variable due to estimation error from the explanatory-power calculation.  These 
upper bounds estimate the absolute maximum amount of information about variation in actual 
teacher quality contained by easily observable teacher qualifications.  For math, we estimate an 
upper bound on the true R
2 from our second-stage analysis of approximately 0.057.  For reading, 
the estimated upper bound is just 0.029.  Even these upper bounds clearly show that observable 
teacher qualifications are weak predictors of variation in outcome-based teacher quality.   
 
We  also  consider  an  expanded  version  of  our  second-stage  model  that  includes  all  of  the 
observable teacher qualifications available in the data (see Table 1).
34  In this case, we estimate 
upper bounds of 0.070 and 0.068 for the math and reading analyses respectively.  However, we 
note that our upper bound results are more likely to be overstated with this larger model.  See 
Appendix D for details. 
 
Finally, we consider the unlikely scenario that schools are already identifying effective teachers 
in ways that evade our methodology and that this identifi cation is reflected in teacher salaries.  
We run another second-stage regression to see how well teacher salaries alone predict teacher 
                                                 
34 This expanded model includes indicator variables for undergraduate minors, credential levels, CLAD and BCLAD 
( (Bilingual) Cross-Cultural Language and Development) certifications, additional supplementary authorizations, 
additional undergraduate majors and additional advanced degrees.  We also include a separate variable that controls 
for experience at SDUSD specifically.   28 
quality to test for this possibility.  We generate upper bounds on the percentage of variation in 
teacher quality explained by teacher salaries to be just 1.4 percent in math and 0.9 percent in 
reading.  This result suggests that teacher compensation, which in SDUSD as in most public 
school districts depends heavily on teacher tenure, highest degree and teaching credentials, bears 
almost no relation whatsoever to teaching effectiveness.   
 
 
IX.  Teacher Fixed Effects and Teacher Evaluations 
 
The weak link between outcome-based teacher quality and the qualifications by which most 
teachers  are  evaluated  should  perhaps  encourage  the  use  of  alternative  measures  of  quality.  
Among educational-accountability advocates, one proposal is to incorporate output from models 
similar to our own into teacher evaluations directly (for example, see Gordon, Kane and Staiger, 
2004).
35   
 
To  assess  th e  feasibility  of  using  statistically  estimated  teacher  coefficients  for  teacher 
evaluations, we first examine whether they contain a sufficiently large signal of actual teacher 
quality.  For math, our variance decomposition in Section IV indicates that the  variance of the 
teacher-quality signal is roughly 60 percent of the total fixed -effects variance.  For reading, 50 
percent of total fixed-effects variance represents the true signal of quality.  Because the relative 
magnitudes of the signal and noise comp onents of the individual teacher coefficients will be 
reflective of the entire sample, on average, we use these distribution-wide estimates as estimates 
                                                 
35 An initial concern is whether teachers should be evaluated within or between schools.  Because Table 5 shows 
that virtually all of the variation in teacher value-added at SDUSD occurs within schools and that there is a 
considerable degree of within-school student sorting, we use the full within-school and within-student specification 
documented in equation (2) in our teacher-evaluation analysis.  We consider the costs associated with this strategy in 
Tables 8 and 9 below.   29 
of the average signal-to-noise ratios that characterize the individually estimated teacher fixed 
effects in math and reading. 
 
On the one hand, these estimates indicate that the teacher-quality signal contained by the value-
added coefficients represents a significant improvement over current methods, as discussed in 
the previous section.  However, the high levels of estimation error inherent in the individual 
fixed effects make their application to teacher evaluation or merit pay programs worthy of a 
cautious approach.   
 
To illustrate the potential consequences associated with the noise found in our estimates we 
examine the persistence of estimated teacher fixed effects across years.  For this analysis, we 
focus on student math performance.
36  We break our student sample into two separate subsets 
based on the year of the differenced dependent variable from equation (2) in Section II.  For the 
first group, the dependent variable in equation  (2) is the difference between spring 2002 and 
spring 2001 test scores.  For the second, the dependent variable is the difference between  spring 
2001 and spring 2000 test scores.  We reference the first group as “year t” and the second group 
as “year t-1”.  After separating our sample, we independently estimate equation (2) and generate 
two separate vectors of teacher coefficients, one from each subset of student data.  The teacher 
coefficients estimated from these data subsets are based on different but partially overlapping 
groups of students.  We evaluate the effects of the 941 teachers (out of our initial sample of 
1,064) who taught students in both subsets. 
                                                 
36 Dividing our student sample into two distinct student subsets and performing our analysis separately for each of 
these subsets introduces substantial noise into our teacher coefficient estimates.  In our math analysis, teacher 
coefficient estimates retained enough signal to make the split-sample analysis possible.  However, in reading the 
estimation error introduced by splitting our sample increased the estimation error variance so much that informative 
analysis was not possible because the signal-to-noise ratio was close to zero.   30 
 
Following a methodology similar to that of Aaronson, Barrow and Sander (2007), we examine 
the rank-persistence of teacher fixed effects across the student subsets.  Within each vector of 
teacher fixed effects we divide teachers into quintiles based on their value-added rankings where 
quintile-5 teachers are those with the highest value-added.  Table 7 demonstrates the persistence 
of these quintile rankings across the data subsets.   
 
Table 7.  Persistence of Teacher Fixed Effects Estimates across Data Subsets (Percentages) 







  1  2  3  4  5 (best) 
1  30  20  19  18  13 
2  23  25  13  21  18 
3  18  20  25  24  13 
4  15  16  26  20  23 
5 (best)  13  17  16  19  35 
Note: (N = 941).  Teachers are placed into quintiles using coefficient estimates from each data subset separately, 
quintile 5 being the best.  Rows sum to 100 percent.   
 
If teacher quality were perfectly observable through statistical estimation and constant over time, 
entries along the diagonal of Table 7 would all equal 100 percent and all off-diagonal entries 
would all equal 0.  Clearly, this is not the case.  In fact, significant fractions of teachers move up 
or down by two quintiles or more when we shift our student sample.
37  However, the southeast 
and northwest corners of Table 7 suggest that the best and worst teachers (who are ranked in the 
top and bottom quintiles) are significantly more likely to retain their distinctions across years 
relative to other teachers in the sample.  Although this result is largely by design (these quintiles 
are open-ended), it is nonetheless an important feature of this analysis because it is precisely 
                                                 
37  Importantly,  the  coefficients  evaluated  in  Table  7  contain  much  higher  levels  of  estimation  error  than  their 
counterparts from our full model.  This is the result of splitting our student sample because, in doing so, we reduce 
the number of observations available to estimate each teacher coefficient.  The increased estimation error will lead 
to an understatement of the persistence of teacher effects.  An additional concern is that the length of our panel 
forces us to overlap two of the four years of student data to perform the split-sample analysis.  Through this overlap, 
the correlation between the two sets of teacher fixed effects may be artificially increased because the errors in the 
two sets of estimates may be positively correlated.     31 
these teachers who would be targeted by a teacher-accountability system.  Therefore, the bleak 
outlook portrayed in Table 7 may be somewhat mitigated when considered in the context of an 
evaluation system focusing on the identification the best and worst teachers. 
 
One concern in our split-sample analysis is that it will understate the persistence of teacher 
effects as a result of our within-school-and-student specification.  This is because the stability 
estimates from the transition matrix in Table 7 are affected by changes in teachers‟ comparison 
groups as teachers move in and out of schools over time.  Although teacher movement over time 
would affect even a between-school analysis, its effects are amplified by our within-school-and-
student  approach  because  each  teacher‟s  comparison  group  is  smaller  and  therefore  more 
responsive to teacher turnover.
38   
 
We present two additional transition matrices analogous to the one in Table 7 to evaluate this 
concern.  The first matrix is generated from a between -school-and-student specification (this 
specification  omits  school -level  covariates and  school -  and  student-level  fixed  effects,  see 
column 6 in Table 5) and is detailed in Table 8.  The second is still based on the within -school-
and-student specification but only uses data from a given school if the average teacher taught at 
that school in at least three out of the four years of the data panel (84 out of the 108 elementary 
schools used in this analysis were designated as “low-turnover” by this standard).  This matrix is 
detailed in Table 9. 
                                                 
38 Another concern here could be that teachers‟ quality levels may be changing over time with experience.  Although 
the results from Section XIII indicate that experience is only weakly related to value-added, we nonetheless look to 
see if more experienced teachers have more stable value-added estimates.  If experience plays a non-negligible role, 
we should expect relatively inexperienced teachers to have less stable value-added coefficients because performance 
has been shown to change most rapidly in the early years of teachers‟ careers.  We do not find any evidence that 
more experienced teachers have more stable value-added estimates.   32 
 
Table 8.  Persistence of Teacher Fixed Effects Estimates across Data Subsets (Percentages) 
– Between-Schools-and-Students Specification 







  1  2  3  4  5 (best) 
1  43  29  14  10  4 
2  26  21  25  18  9 
3  12  21  28  25  15 
4  10  19  19  28  23 
5 (best)  8  11  11  19  50 
Note: (N = 941).  Teachers are placed into quintiles using coefficient estimates from each data subset separately, 
quintile 5 being the best.  Rows sum to 100 percent.   
 
Table 9.  Persistence of Teacher Fixed Effects Estimates across Data Subsets (Percentages) 
– Within-Schools-and-Students Specification, Low-Turnover Schools Only 







  1  2  3  4  5 (best) 
1  35  25  16  14  11 
2  19  27  23  15  15 
3  18  20  20  25  17 
4  14  21  18  23  25 
5 (best)  12  9  25  24  29 
Note: (N = 824).  Teachers are placed into quintiles using coefficient estimates from each data subset separately, 
quintile 5 being the best.  Rows sum to 100 percent.   
 
The tight comparisons among teachers created by our within-school-and-student specification do 
appear to affect the persistence of teacher effects across the student subsets.  In Table 8 the 
contrast is most stark; looking between schools results in a large increase in the persistence of 
teacher effects and significantly reduces the percentage of teachers who move more than one 
quintile in either direction in the transition matrix.  Of course, this increased persistence reflects 
not only the more stable comparison group for each teacher (all teachers in the district rather than 
just  the  teachers  at  a  given  school)  but  also  the  persistence  of  school-level  effects  that  are 
correlated with teacher effects. 
   33 
The differences between Table 7 and Table 9, where we look at low-turnover schools, are more 
subtle.  Although the sums of the diagonal elements of each matrix are very similar, there are 
significant reductions in the number of teachers who move more than one and more than two 
quintiles across the transition matrix when we focus our analysis on schools with lower teacher 
turnover.   
 
Together,  the  transition  matrices  in  Tables  8  and  9  show  that  teacher  turnover  can  play  an 
important  role  in  determining  year-by-year  teacher  fixed  effects  estimated  using  the  within-
school-and-student  specification.    This  implies  that  year-by-year  value-added  estimates  may 
represent an infeasible standard for evaluating teacher quality. 
 
 
X.  Conclusion 
 
We show that teachers vary in quality considerably more than previous research has implied.  In 
math,  we  find  that  the  average  effect  on  student  performance  of  a  one-standard  deviation 
improvement  in  teacher  quality  in  a  given  year  corresponds  to  0.26  average  within-grade 
standard  deviations  in  test  scores.    In  reading,  the  same  improvement  in  teacher  quality 
corresponds to 0.19 average within-grade standard deviations.  These are very large effects.   
 
Our analysis highlights the importance of the testing instrument used to evaluate teacher quality.  
We show that when a test-score ceiling restricts students‟ test-score gains, teacher effects can be 
significantly understated.  However, including controls for heterogeneity in student test-score 
growth (i.e., student fixed effects) in the value-added specification may at least partially mitigate 
this problem.   34 
 
Given the importance of variation in outcome-based teacher quality as a determinant of student 
achievement, we test to see if the qualifications by which most teachers are evaluated are related 
to actual performance measured by student outcomes.  Our empirical results strongly support 
earlier findings that observable teacher qualifications are only weakly related to outcome-based 
measures of teacher quality.  To emphasize this, we estimate upper bounds on the explanatory 
power of observable teacher qualifications and show that even at these bounds, the information 
about teacher quality contained by these observable measures is minimal.  The persistence of this 
result throughout the modern empirical literature should perhaps lead to long-term changes in 
teacher recruitment, as  well as teacher credentialing and professional development.  Perhaps 
most  of  all,  the  system  for  setting  teacher  pay  largely  as  a  function  of  teacher  experience, 
education  and  credentials  may  require  radical  reform.    We  show  that  teachers‟  salaries  can 
explain, at most, 0.9 to 1.4 percent of actual variation in performance-based teacher quality.  
 
Finally, the future role of value-added as a determinant of teacher accountability is still unclear.  
On the one hand, the signal contained by value-added estimates is sizeable, especially when 
compared to the current standards by which most teachers are evaluated.  However, on the other, 
there is also a considerable degree of estimation error in the teacher coefficients which suggests a 
cautious approach to their implementation for accountability purposes.  One solution would be to 
incorporate value-added into a larger system of teacher accountability.  Employing value-added 
estimates  in  conjunction  with  other  measures  of  teacher  quality  that  are  unlikely  to  have 
correlated  measurement  errors  should  diminish  the  impact  of  these  errors  and  increase  the 




Section II illustrates the statistical model that seems most appropriate for accurately describing 
student  test-score  performance.    Specifically,  the  model  accounts  for  numerous  sources  of 
variation in student achievement including variation due to student fixed effects, all within the 
value-added framework.  The structure of the model excludes the use of some of the SDUSD 
data in that it requires at least three contiguous test scores per student for full identification.  
However, we require this data restriction in order to specify the most accurate statistical model of 
student  performance  possible.    Because  our  entire  analysis  hinges  on  the  soundness  of  our 
teacher  fixed  effects  estimates,  the  importance  of  a  properly  specified  model  of  student 
performance from which teacher fixed effects are estimated cannot be overstated.  Table A1 
details the differences between the final sample of students used in our analysis and the general 
elementary student population at SDUSD.   36 
Table A1.  Key Differences Between the Entire SDUSD Elementary Student Sample and 
the Final Sample Used for Estimation 
  All Students  Students with 3 + Years of Data 
 
Race 
   % White 
   % Black 
   % Asian 
   % Hispanic 
    
% English Learners 
 
SAT 9 Math Score* 
SAT 9 Reading Score* 
 
Avg. Percentage of School 





























Our final sample includes 16,303 unique students with at least 3 student-years of data out of a possible 29,973 students who would have been 
eligible to be included in our model based on the year that they started the 3
rd grade.  
*Test score performance is measured in average standard deviations from the “All Students” mean (by grade). 
 
 
As would be predicted, our analysis is based on students who appear to be slightly advantaged 
relative  to  the  SDUSD  population  as  a  whole.    However,  our  final  student  sample  is  still 
reasonably  diverse  and  generally  representative  of  the  student  population  at  SDUSD.    The 
biggest difference between the two student populations is in terms of testing performance.  Note 
that the “all students” sample includes students who are movers in the sense that they do not 
have  three  contiguous  test  scores.    Thus,  Table  A.1  is  consistent  with  the  well-documented 
negative relationship between student mobility and performance (see, for example, Rumberger 
and Larson, 1998; or Ingersoll, Scamman and Eckerling, 1989). 
 
With respect to teachers, we must also be careful about inclusion in our model.  Kane and Staiger 
(2002) find strong evidence of the significant impact of sampling variation on the outcomes of 
incentive  systems  based  on  school-level  mean  performance  measures  in  North  Carolina.  
Particularly, they find that schools with the smallest populations are considerably more likely to   37 
receive rewards or sanctions based on student performance because the variance of the average 
of students‟ test scores from year to year is highest in small schools.  A magnified version of this 
problem arises in our teacher analysis.   
 
By virtue of the general structure of elementary education, elementary school teachers teach just 
a small number of students each year.  Even in studies such as this where numerous years of data 
are available for each teacher, there are still relatively few data points with which to estimate 
teacher  fixed  effects.    Particularly  in  cases  where  class  sizes  fluctuate  significantly  across 
teachers, or drop to extremely low levels more generally, the impact of sampling variation can 
dwarf any true signal.   Therefore, in an effort to reduce this inherent noise, we restrict our 
teacher sample to teachers with at least 20 student-years of data.  This threshold was chosen as it 
corresponds  to  approximately  one  year  of  teaching  a  full  elementary  classroom.    The  mean 
elementary  class  size  in  our  full  dataset  is  22.5  students  with  a  standard  deviation  of 
approximately 5.5.  Thus, a teacher with the mean number of students in her classroom can 
afford to have up to two students dropped for one reason or another and still be used in our study.  
Furthermore, this standard removes many teachers who have taught particularly few students.  
The mean number of student-years per teacher among the dropped teachers was approximately 
eight.  The selection of different student-year cutoff points from as low as 17 student-years to as 
high as 30 student-years of data reveal no significant changes in our general results beyond the 
expected mild changes in the precision of teacher coefficient estimates.    38 
 
Again,  restricting  our  sample  of  teachers  restricts  the  population  for  which  our  results  are 
relevant.    Table  A2  details  key  differences  between  the  entire  SDUSD  elementary  teacher 
population and the sample used in this study.   
 
Table A2.  Key Differences Between the Entire SDUSD Elementary Teacher Sample and 
the Final Sample Used for Estimation 




% Fully Credentialed 
































Our final sample includes 1,064 teachers from a total of 1,560 potentially eligible teachers available for this study.  We define a potentially 
eligible teacher as a teacher who teaches at least 15 students with at least a current and a lagged test score over the course of the panel.  This 
eligibility requirement would seem to be an absolute minimum for any value-added study.  Recall that for our study we require teachers to teach 
at least 20 students with at least 3 test scores over the course of our panel. 
It is often presumed that majors in education are somewhat easier to obtain than majors in other fields (For example, see Ballou, 1996). 
 
With respect to teachers, there is a surprisingly small difference between teachers used in our 
sample  and  the  entire  SDUSD  elementary  teacher  population.    Our  sample  still  includes 
significant variability among teachers in key observable qualifications.  After removing teachers 
with fewer than 20 student-years of data, the average number of student-years of data per teacher 
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        
Thus, scaling this summation by the number of teachers returns an estimate of the average ratio 
of the total fixed-effects variance to the total error variance weighted on a coefficient-by-
coefficient basis.     40 
Appendix C 
Estimating an Upper Bound on the Correlation of 
Teacher Value-Added Across Subjects 
 
We generate an upper bound on the correlation of teacher quality across subjects, corr m r ( , )   , 
under  the  assumption  that  the  correlation  coefficient  reported  in  Section  VII  is  understated 
because  corr m r ( , )    0 and this is suppressing our estimate  of  corr m r (  ,  )   .  Consider the 
following: 
corr m r m m r r m m r r (  ,  ) {cov( , )/{ var( ) * var( )}                      (C.1) 
The correlation coefficient of interest in this analysis is corr m r ( , )   .  To obtain an upper-bound 
estimate,  we  will  assume  that  cov( , )   m r  0,  cov( , )   r m  0,  and  cov( , )   m r  0  (these 
conditions  also  imply  that  cov( , )   m m  0  and  cov( , )   r r  0  because  we  know  that 
cov( , )   m r  0) and expect that none of these covariance terms would be negative.
39  Given 
these conditions we can rewrite equation (C.1) as: 
corr m r m r m m r r (  ,  ) {cov( , )/{ var( ) * var( )}                    (C.2) 
By definition, our correlation coefficient of interest is defined as: 
corr m r m r m r ( , ) cov( , )/{ var( ) * var( )}                    (C.3) 
Combining C.2 and C.3, we can write: 
corr corr m r m r m m m r r r ( , ) (  ,  )*( var( )/ var( ))*( var( )/ var( ))                 (C.4) 
This can once again be re-written as: 
                                                 
39It is the non-negativity assumption that insures that we are generating an upper bound by setting the covariance of 
the estimation errors to zero. We justify this assumption by noting that although it is conceivable that there would be 
a positive correlation between estimation errors for the same classrooms but different subjects, it would be hard to 
imagine a scenario in which these estimation errors would be negatively correlated.       41 
corr corr m r m r m fe m true r fe r true ( , ) (  ,  )*( / )*( / ) , , , ,         
2 2 2 2         (C.5) 
Here,  ,fe
2   represents the total variance of teacher fixed effects and  ,true
2   represents the 
variance of teacher quality by subject as indicated.  We can plug in values for the above variance 
components using estimates from Section IV.  This generates an upper bound estimate of the 
correlation of teacher effectiveness across subjects of approximately 0.64.   42 
Appendix D 
Upper Bound Estimates of the Percentage of Teacher Value-
Added Predicted by Observable Teacher Qualifications 
 
The  R
2  statistics  reported  in  Table  6  in  Section  VIII  are  meant  to  represent  the  amount  of 
variation in the teacher coefficients explained by observable teacher qualifications.  However, 
these  R
2  values  are  potentially  inaccurate  due  to  measurement  error  in  our  second-stage 
dependent variable and because they are generated from a GLS regression.  Our analysis in the 
text proceeds under the assumption that the measurement error found in our teacher fixed effects 
coefficients is uncorrelated with observable teacher qualifications.
40   If this is the case, basic R
2 
estimates from our second stage analysis will understate the ability of our models to explain true 
teacher quality because the R
2 statistics are implicitly allowing for the models to predict the 
measurement error in the dependent variable (which they do not do by assumption).  In this 
appendix,  we  establish  upper  bound  estimates  of  the  R
2  statistics  from  our  second-stage 
regressions  under  the  assumption  that  observable  teacher  qualifications  do  not  predict  the 
measurement error in our teacher coefficients.  If this assumption is incorrect, results from this 
appendix will over-state the predictive power of observable teacher qualifications. 
 
The GLS estimation performed in Section VIII of the text is used to generate efficient estimates 
of our coefficients of interest.  However, because R
2 statistics from GLS models are difficult to 
interpret, we proceed here with R
2 statistics from the OLS analogs to the models described in the 
paper.  In order to generate an upper bound on the percentage of variation in true teacher quality 
                                                 
40 Beyond being very plausible, this assumption is also useful for generating upper bound estimates of the R
2 
statistics from our second-stage models.  If observable teacher qualifications were somehow predicting the 
measurement error in the teacher fixed effects even slightly, estimates presented in this appendix will be overstated.   43 
explained by observable characteristics, first consider the general R
2 formula that is estimated by 
standard software packages for our second-stage analysis: 
    R
2    = 1 – (SSE/SST)            (D.1) 












       (D.2) 
The R
2 formula in equation (D.2) is a consistent estimate of: 
   1
2 2    [ (  ) ]/[ ( ) ] E y y E y y j j j         (D.3) 
In this equation, the  y j‟s correspond to the estimated teacher fixed effects coefficients from the 
first stage, the   ' y s j  are the fitted values of the estimated teacher coefficients from our OLS 
second-stage regression, and  y  is the mean of the first-stage estimated teacher coefficients.  The 
y j‟s can be decomposed as follows: 
y y j jtrue j                (D.4) 
Here,  y jtrue represents true teacher quality and  j represents the contribution of estimation error.  
Substituting equation (D.4) into equation (D.3) yields: 
1
2 2      [ (  ) ]/[ ( ) ] E y y E y y jtrue j j jtrue j       (D.5) 
Because  y jtrue and  j are uncorrelated by assumption, the denominator of the second term in 
equation (D.5) simplifies to  [ ( ) ( )] Var y Var jtrue j   .    With  regard  to  the  numerator,  we  will 
continue under the prior that the predictive power of observable teacher qualifications is being 
understated because observable teacher qualifications do not predict the estimation error in our 
dependent variable.  Therefore, in the spirit of estimating an upper bound we can assume that   y j 
and j are also uncorrelated.  Equation (D.5) can be written as:   44 
1
2     [ (  ) ( )]/[ ( ) ( )] E y y Var Var y Var jtrue j j jtrue j       (D.6) 
If observable teacher qualifications do not predict the estimation error, the above formula adds a 
positive number representing the variance of the estimation error into both the numerator and 
denominator of the second term as shown in equation (D.6).  Because this term is subtracted 
from one, this results in an unequivocal understatement of the R
2 reported from our second-stage 
model. 
 
We can remove the variance of the estimation error from both the numerator and denominator of 
the second term to estimate an upper bound on the true level of explanatory power exhibited by 
observable teacher qualifications: 
         1
2 2    [ (  ) ]/[ ( ) ] E y y E y y jtrue j jtrue true       (D.7) 
Using our empirical results from Section IV and the   ' y s j  from our second stage regression, we 
estimate equation (D.7) with: 
R












      (D.8) 
It is clear to see how any incidental correlation between the   ' y s j  and thej‟s will lead to an 
overstatement of this statistic, and thus it is presented as an upper bound.  As reported in the text, 
our upper bound estimates on the explanatory power of observable teacher qualifications are 
0.057 and 0.029 for math and reading respectively.   45 
Appendix E 
Teacher Quality and Different Student Types 
 
To provide a test of whether teacher effectiveness varies by initial student achievement, we split 
our student records into two groups based on initial student achievement.  Specifically, for each 
student record, we compare the student‟s year (t-2) test score to the grade-level median test score 
for their grade.
41  The first group consists of students who performed at or above the median 
level of achievement in year (t-2), the second of students who performed below the median.  We 
assign an indicator variable equal to 1 if a student reco rd belongs to the first group and 0 
otherwise. 
 
Next,  we  interact  this  achievement  indicator  variable  with  each  of  our  teacher  indicator 
variables.
42  We then add this new set of interaction terms to the full specification outlined in 
Section II.  The interaction terms will pick up any differences in teacher quality experienced by 
high-achieving students relative to low-achieving students.  That is, if teachers affect different 
student types differently on a per-teacher basis, then we should find that the se t of interaction 
terms are jointly significant in explaining variation in student performance.  However, we find no 
evidence that the impact of teacher quality varies by student type.  For both math and reading, 
Wald tests fail to reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients on all of the interaction terms are 
zero.  For both math and reading, the p-values from these Wald tests are greater than 0.9. 
 
                                                 
41 For example, if a student was in third grade in year (t-2), we look to see if his or her test score in third grade was 
above or below the third-grade median test score in our sample.   
42 A small percentage (less than 2% for each subject) of the teachers in our sample had all of their students in one 
achievement group or the other.  For these teachers, their interaction terms were dropped from the model.     46 
Appendix F 
Test-Score Ceiling Properties at SDUSD 
 
The Stanford 9 standardized test used at SDUSD does not exhibit a test-score ceiling in math and 
exhibits only a mild-test score ceiling in reading through the 5
th grade.  As discussed in Section 
VI of the text, this feature of the Stanford 9 makes it a better instrument with which to measure 
the variance of teacher quality than some tests used in previous studies.  In this appendix, we 
detail the test-score ceiling properties of the Stanford 9 for both math and reading. 
 
Earlier work with the dataset revealed evidence of some regression to the mean in test scores.  
This makes it difficult to test for pure ceiling effects by plotting test-score gains in period (t) vs. 
test score levels in period (t-1) because in part there should be a negative relationship between 
the two because of regression to the mean.  Therefore, to test for the presence of a test-score 
ceiling in our data, we group all students into achievement deciles based on their raw test score 
level in period (t-2).  We then look to see if the average test-score gains of students in period (t) 
are lower for students in higher deciles.  Figures F.1 and F.2 describe our findings.  For math, the 
Stanford 9 standardized test does not appear to exhibit a test score ceiling.   For reading, there is 




                                                 
43 Hanushek et al. (2005) present a figure similar to figure F.1 in their analysis.  However, in their study, students are 
grouped into achievement deciles based on period (t-1) test scores, thus combining any test-score ceiling effects with 
regression to the mean.  If we replicate our figures in this appendix following their methodology, we observe a 
negative relationship for both math and reading as would be expected due to regression to the mean.  However, the 
magnitude of the decline in average test score gains is significantly less in our data when we replicate their analysis 
and average test-score gains are positive for all student-achievement deciles.   47 
Figure F.1
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